A first order linear differential equation is used to describe the dynamics of an investment fund that promises more than it can deliver, also known as a Ponzi scheme. The model is based on a promised, unrealistic interest rate; on the actual, realized nominal interest rate; on the rate at which new deposits are accumulated and on the withdrawal rate. Conditions on these parameters are given for the fund to be solvent or to collapse. The model is fitted to data available on Charles Ponzi's 1920 eponymous scheme and illustrated with a philanthropic version of the scheme.
Introduction
On December 11, 2008, Bernard L. Madoff was arrested for allegedly running a multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme in which investors across the world lost $ 50 billion dollars (Henriques and Kouwe, 2008) . The principle of such a scheme is simple: you entice potential investors by promising a high rate of return, which you cannot possibly deliver. The only way you can pay the promised interest is by attracting new investors whose money you use to pay interests to those already in the fund.
Various macroeconomic models of rational Ponzi games have been described in the literature (O 'Connell and Zeldes, 1998; Bhattacharya, 2003; Blanchard and Weil, 2001; Forslid, 1998) . Micro Ponzi schemes have proliferated particularly on the Internet to the point that regulators fear "Ponzimonium" (Blas, 2009 ). Here we wish to investigate the mathematics of Ponzi schemes by going beyond the simplistic pyramid-type explanations that rely on a more or less rapid doubling of the number of new investors.
Madoff's fund is only the most recent and perhaps biggest Ponzi scheme in history. Madoff offered a supposedly safe 10 % return, which was considered unrealistic, particularly in the financial climate prevailing at the end of 2008.
Still, if he could invest the money at a two or three percent interest rate and if new deposits came in fast enough he could use the fresh money to pay those who withdrew their earnings. But how fast must new deposits come in? How long can the scheme last? What parameters drive the dynamics of the fund?
In this paper we provide some answers to these questions with a simple model that captures the main features of a Ponzi scheme. The model is described in section 2 with detailed results on the behavior of the fund as a function of seven parameters. In section 3 we describe Charles Ponzi's eponymous 1920 scheme and crudely fit the model to the data available (see Zuckoff (2005) and Dunn (2004) for biographies of this colorful character).
We also discuss an improbable "philanthropic Ponzi scheme" that may have something to do with Social Security. Highlights and the main results are 2 brought together in the concluding section 4.
The model

Assumptions
We assume that the fund starts at time t = 0 with an initial deposit K ≥ 0 followed by a continuous cash inflow s (t) . We next assume a promised rate of return r p and a nominal interest rate r n at which the money is actually invested. If r n ≥ r p then the fund is legal and has a profit rate r n − r p . If r n < r p the fund is promising more than it can deliver. The promised rate r p may be called the "Ponzi rate" and is equal to 0.10 in the introductory example. The nominal interest rate r n is 0.02 or 0.03 in that example.
We need to model the fact that investors withdraw at least some of their money along the way. The simplest way of doing this is to assume a constant withdrawal rate r w applied at every time t to the promised accumulated capital. The withdrawal at time t by those who invested the initial amount K is
. If r w is less than the promised rate r p then these withdrawals increase exponentially; r w can also be larger than r p in which case withdrawals decrease exponentially as these investors are eating into the capital
K.
In order to calculate the withdrawals at time t from those who added to the fund between times 0 and t we note that those who invested s(u) at time u will want to withdraw at time t > u a quantity r w s(u)e (rp−rw) (t−u) . Integrating these withdrawals from 0 to t and adding the previously calculated withdrawals from the initial deposit K yields the total withdrawals at time t
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We note that the nominal interest rate r n does not appear in W (t): withdrawals are based only on the promised rate of return r p .
The differential equation
If S(t) is the amount in the fund at time t then S(t + dt) is obtained by adding to S(t) the nominal interest r n S(t)dt, the inflow of fresh money s(t)dt and subtracting the withdrawals W (t)dt:
For dt → 0 the amount S(t) is the solution to the first order linear differential
We let C = S(0) be the initial condition which may or may not be equal to K, the initial deposit made by customers. The fund managers can make an initial "in-house" deposit K 0 ≥ 0, which will also be invested at the nominal rate r n . In this case the initial value C = K 0 + K is larger than K. An initial condition C < K formally corresponds to the case where for some reason (theft or other) a fraction of the initial deposits K is not available. We will see later that the solution to the differential equation with an initial condition C = S(0) other than K will be used when there is at some subsequent time A simple assumption one can make on the cash inflow s(t) is that of exponential growth: 
where the fraction should be taken equal to t when r w + r i − r p = 0.
The solution S(t) to the differential equation (3) has a closed-form expression which will be formulated using the function g (t, a, b, c, d, α) def.
= ae
With this notation S(t) is
where
c def.
The solution S(t) of Eq. (7) is a linear combination of three exponentials, which we were not able to tackle directly by elementary methods. Indeed, the zeros of S(t) and of its derivative can be calculated numerically but no closed forms were found, which precludes analytical results on the behavior of the function.
If however we know the number of positive zeros of S(t) we can shed light on the conditions under which the fund is solvent (S(t) remains positive).
We will see that depending on parameter values S(t) of Eq. (7) Analytical results on the number of positive zeros will be obtained by noting that the zeros of S(t) are also those of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) of Eq. (6). This function is a linear combination of only two exponentials plus a constant. The zeros still cannot be found in closed form by elementary methods. However the derivative of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) is a linear combination of two exponentials with no constant, which can be studied analytically. The following proposition provides results on the number of positive zeros of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) .
We consider the function g (t, a, b, c, d, α) 
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The function g (t, a, b, c, d, α) has an extremum
at the positive value (t, a, b, c, d, α) : , a, b, c, d, α) has no positive zero ( Proof. The proof is elementary and hinges on the following facts: a, b, c, d, α) equals 0 at t c and m is the value of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) at t c ; t c is positive if and only if Condition (13) is satisfied. The derivative g (0, a, b, c, d, α) at 0 is equal to ab + cd. 3. If Condition (13) is not satisfied then either g (t, a, b, c, d, α) has an extremum for a negative value of t or no extremum at all. In both cases the function g (t, a, b, c, d, α) for t > 0 is monotone increasing if ab + cd > 0 and monotone decreasing otherwise.
The limiting cases ab + cd = 0, m = 0, etc. pose no difficulty and are left as exercises.
Main result
In order to apply Proposition 1 to the parameters a, b, c, d, α of Eqs. (8)- (12) we first define
We will need the function
which is the critical value of C above which α of Eq. (12) is positive.
We define the function
and note that Z(K) = 1 if and only if K = s 0 /r w (i.e. σ K = 0).
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The extremum m of Eq. (14) and the corresponding t c of Eq. (15) are
We also define the function C 2 (K) as
The quantity C 2 (K) of Eq. (21) is the critical value of C above which the extremum m of Eq. (19) is positive.
With these notations we have the following result on the number of positive zeros of S(t) of Eq. (7).
Theorem 1. We consider the solution S(t) of Eq. 
We first consider the case r n > r i .
If C > C 2 (K) (which includes the case C = K) then S(t) has no positive zero for t > 0 and therefore remains positive for all
has one positive zero on each side of t c . For
has one positive zero. When r p < r n < r i the function S(t) has one positive zero for C < C 2 (K) (which includes the case
Sub-case B 2,1 : r w < r p −r n or r n < r i . The function S(t) has one positive zero.
Proof. The application of Proposition 1 hinges on the following observations:
1. The parameter α of Eq. (12) is positive if and only if C > C 1 (K).
2. The extremum m of Eq. (14) is positive if and only if C > C 2 (K).
4. For ρ > 0 the function C 2 (K) is an non decreasing function of K > 0 that has no positive fixed point if r n > r p and one positive fixed point
5. The parameter σ K and the derivative
of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) at 0 have opposite signs.
With a, b, c, d, α of Eqs. (8)- (12) the quantities U and V of (13) are
and are both negative if and only if ρ and σ K have the same sign (because
In the case B 1 (ρ > 0) we consider two sub-cases.
Sub-case B 1,1 : σ K < 0. Condition (13) is not satisfied and the derivative of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) at 0 is positive. The result follows from A 4 of Proposition 1.
Sub-case B 1,2 : σ K > 0. Condition (13) is satisfied and the derivative of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) at 0 is negative. The results follow from A 1 of Proposition 1.
In both sub-cases of B 2 (ρ < 0) the proof relies on the sign of σ K . When (13) is satisfied and the derivative of g (t, a, b, c, d, α) 
Interpretation of results
Theorem 1 breaks down the results depending on whether the rate r i of new investments is larger or smaller than the promised rate of return r p .
We first consider the case when r i is larger than r p (Case B 1 ) and the nominal rate of return r n is also larger than r p (legal fund). In the subcase B 1,1 (K < s 0 /r w ) the fund is solvent (Z = 0) regardless of the initial
Figure 1: Number Z of zeros of the function S(t) in the cases B 1 (ρ > 0) and B 2 (ρ < 0); Z is given in the phase space (r n , r w ). In the sub-case B 2,1 the number Z of zeros is 1 regardless of the values of C and K. In the two sub-cases of B 2,2 and in the three regions of B 1 , the number Z is given in the phase space (K, C).
condition C. In the sub-case B 1,2 (K > s 0 /r w ) the two rightmost graphs in Figure 1 (Case B 1 ) show that the fund remains solvent when C remains above C 2 (K) (which includes the case K = C because the first diagonal (dash-dot line) is above C 2 (K)). For r n between r p and r i the fund collapses (Z = 1) as soon as C drops below C 2 (K) (second graph). For r n larger than r i the fund collapses but recovers (Z = 2) if C does not fall too much below
then the fund collapses (Z = 1).
The first graph of Figure 1 , Case B 1 , shows what happens in a Ponzi scheme (r n < r p ) even with a rate of new investments r i larger than r p .
The fund will be solvent for C = K only if K is not too large (K less than the fixed point K *
). If C = K and is larger than the fixed point K * , then the combined withdrawals by the initial and subsequent investors eventually cause the fund to collapse.
In Case B 2 (the rate of new investments r i is smaller than the promised rate of return r p ) we first consider the sub-case of B 2,2 with r n > r p (legal fund, second graph). The fund remains solvent for C > C 1 (K), which included the case C = K. In the Ponzi sub-case of B 2,2 with r i < r n < r p and r w > r p − r n the fund does not grow too fast and is solvent if C is larger than C 1 (K), which is itself larger than K (first graph). This means that despite an r i and an r n smaller than r p , the Ponzi scheme is solvent if the fund manager can add to K an"in-house" investment K 0 at least equal to C 1 (K) − K.
We will see in the numerical illustrations that C 1 (K) − K can be quite large and the scheme unprofitable for the fund manager, hence the "philanthropic Ponzi scheme" characterization. We emphasize for future reference that this 13 scenario hinges on an investment rate r i that remains smaller than the nominal rate r n . If the manager does not invest enough (C < C 1 (K)) the fund collapses.
The Ponzi sub-case B 2,1 consists of the values r n < r i and of the values (r n , r w ) for which r w < r p − r n and r n is between r i and r p (triangular region below the first graph). In this sub-case B 2,1 the fund grows too fast and collapses (Z = 1).
This analysis shows that the role of r w is ambiguous when r n is between r i and r p . Although a small r w (r w < r p − r n , B 2,1 ) may seem desirable, the fund will grow more in the long run and eventually collapses. A large r w (r w > r p − r n , B 2,2 ) may seem dangerous but depletes the fund and means smaller withdrawals in the long run. The fund is ultimately solvent if C is large enough to absorb the large early withdrawals ("philanthropic Ponzi scheme").
Actual and promised amounts in the fund
In order to describe the dynamics of a fund that includes a sudden parameter change at some time t * , we need to make explicit the role of the parameters by denoting S(t, K, C, s 0 , r i , r w , r p , r n ) the solution of the differential equation given in (7).
We introduce the actual and promised amounts S a (t) and S p (t). The actual amount S a (t) in the fund (based on the nominal rate of return r n and the initial condition C), is the one given in Eq. (7) and rewritten explicitly as
The quantity S p (t) is the amount that is promised to and belongs to investors; S p (t) is obtained by setting in Eq. (25) 
Contrary to the actual amount S a (t) in the fund the promised amount S p (t)
is positive regardless of the parameter values.
Change in parameter values
The assumption of an exponentially increasing density of new investments is not realistic in the long run and we may wish to examine what happens if the investment rate r i suddenly drops to 0. This means that the flow of new investments becomes a constant. More generally, it would be useful to be able to describe the future dynamics of the fund if at a point in time t * the parameters (s 0 , r i , r w , r p , r n ) experience a sudden (discontinuous) change of value and become (s 0 , r i , r w , r p , r n ).
We call C and K the actual and the promised amounts in the fund at
and
These quantities will be the new initial condition and initial investment starting at time t * . The actual and promised amounts at any time t are now
Several discontinuous parameter changes at different times can be dealt with in this fashion.
Applications
Charles Ponzi's original scheme
Ponzi schemes are named after the eponymous Italian adventurer and Trading in these coupons was not realistic, but that did not prevent Ponzi from issuing bonds which offered a 100% profit if held for 90 days (0.25 years).
We translate this 90-day doubling time into an annualized rate of return r p that must satisfy e The actual profit made on the International Reply Coupons was negligible. We thus arbitrarily choose a nominal rate r n of 0.01, although r n could just as well be set equal to 0. Indeed, the impact of a one or even five percent nominal return is negligible in comparison with new investments pouring in at an instantaneous rate of 7.187.
The greatest uncertainty rests with the redemption rate (our withdrawal rate r w ) at which investors cashed in the bonds. We only know that some investors redeemed their bonds after 90 days but that many left their money to double once again. We can however estimate r w crudely on the basis of information available at the time of Ponzi's trial. He redeemed $5 million of his bonds after the July 1920 cessation of activity with $7 million still outstanding. We will take these figures to mean that the promised amount accumulated by time t * = 0.58 is With all other parameter values known, we solved this equation numerically for r w and obtained r w = 1.47 (Table 1) Table 1 ). With r i = 0 < r n = 0.01 < r p = 2.773 we are now in the sub-case B 2,1 of B 2 because r w = 1.47 < r p − r n = 2.763. As expected the fund would have collapsed, with S a (t) reaching 0 roughly nine months after t * (S a (1.30) = 0). The promised amount S p (t) continues to grow exponentially at the rate r p − r w = 1.303.
A philanthropic Ponzi scheme
We noted that if r w > r p − r n and r i < r n < r p , then for C > C 1 (K) the Ponzi scheme is solvent. We will now see why we labeled this scenario "philanthropic". With C − C 1 (K) positive, the asymptotic growth rate of the actual amount S a (t) is r n because the last term (C − C 1 (K))e r n t in Eq.
(25) dominates all other exponential terms. The promised amount S p (t) of Eq. (26) grows at the asymptotic rate r p − r w which is smaller than the nominal r n . The fund's profit is S a (t) − S p (t) and we have for large t
where x(t) ∼ y(t) means that lim t→∞ x(t)/y(t) = 1. If the initial deposit is K = 0 then the initial condition C is equal to the"in-house" investment K 0
and (34) becomes
where C must be larger than C 1 (0). The actual amount S a (t) and the profit S a (t) − S p (t) grow asymptotically at the exponential rate r n but are both smaller than the profit Ce hinges on a philanthropic fund manager who is willing to invest a significant initial amount and give away a share of her profits.
We will see how large the initial investment C must be with the example of a manager offering a 15% return to individuals who contribute one million dollars a year and continuously withdraw 12% of their accumulated capital (r p = 0.15, s 0 = 1, r i = 0, r w = 0.12, Table 1 ). We assume the manager can realistically earn 4 % (r n = 0.04). With no initial deposits by investors (K = 0) the fund manager's minimum investment C to keep the fund solvent is C 1 (0) = 275. With C = 280 we plotted in Figure 3 the functions ln(S a (t))/t and ln(S p (t))/t to show their convergence to r n = 0.04 and r p − r w = 0.03 21 respectively. We also plotted ln(Ce rnt )/t = ln(C)/t + r n , which is the natural logarithm divided by time t of the accumulated amount had the $280 million been invested at the nominal rate r n . This quantity also converges to r n = 0.04 while staying larger than ln(S a (t))/t and ln(S p (t))/t.
An initial investment of $280 million dollars to sustain (at a loss) a fund that grows by only $1 million a year may not be a fund manager's idea of a profitable venture. This example was provided only to illustrate the fact that with a sufficiently large initial "in-house" investment a Ponzi scheme can be solvent with no or a very small growth in deposits and a nominal interest rate smaller than the promised one. The same Social Security source indicates that the German and U.S. Social Security systems have been in operation since 1889 and 1935 , respectively. DeWitt (2009 implies that this longevity disqualifies these systems as Ponzi schemes. However our model makes clear that a Ponzi scheme can last a long time before collapsing or even indefinitely with or without a growth in deposits. In particular, our philanthropic Ponzi scheme which relies on a large initial investment may approximate a perfectly legal and legitimate non-profit government investment into a social security scheme meant to provide fixed incomes to a growing population of retirees. We recall however that in this case the solvency of the fund depends on an investment rate r i 22 that remains smaller than the nominal rate of return r n . Although the role of population growth is beyond the scope of this paper, this shows that the retiree population and its investments must not grow too rapidly in order for the fund to be solvent. As we expected the fund is always solvent with C = K in the case of a legal fund characterized by r n > r p . In a Ponzi scheme (r n < r p ) the fund can remain solvent depending on the values of the investment rate r i and the 23 withdrawal rate r w . The model sheds light on the ambiguous role played by these two parameters. If r i is too large or r w too small the fund grows fast and can be in jeopardy as withdrawals increase. If r i is too small or r w too large the fund may not be able to keep up with withdrawals.
Conclusion
Our model yields a variety of increasing trajectories that may look alike initially, but are fundamentally different in their long-run behavior. Some will continue to increase as long as new investments come in -others will increase possibly for a long time before they collapse. This happens when parameter values in the phase spaces of solutions are close to border regions between different qualitative behaviours (for example between no zero and one zero for the function S(t)). In some cases S(t) initially decreases, reaches a positive or negative minimum, and then recovers.
Finally, our results can provide concrete answers to financial regulators and others confronted with funds that make unrealistic claims. Suppose one investigates a fund that promises a 10% return per month, provides its own initial "in house" investment of $5 millions dollars, claims a doubling of its deposits every two months and has investors who withdraw half their earnings every year. It is now possible to predict what will happen to the fund, at least under the simple assumptions made in the model described in this paper.
